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Stephen A. Yoder*
Few recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court have created
quite the stir as did Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.  One1
reason the opinion had such an effect is that it contains a smorgasbord of
business-related legal and political issues, including issues relating to election
law, ethics, social responsibility, stare decisis, judicial review, selection of
Supreme Court Justices, the definition of free speech, and corporate
“personhood” for purposes of the First Amendment.  Perhaps surprising for2
a case involving a lawsuit brought by a nonprofit public advocacy
organization against the federal agency charged with enforcing federal
election laws, the opinion also ventures into one of the most important current
issues in corporate governance, the role of shareholders in the business and
affairs of a corporation.
Citizens United reflects a larger struggle underway in the United States
and elsewhere over the relative roles of the various participants in the
operation of complex business organizations, particularly the role of
shareholders relative to management and the board of directors. Many
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observers view the Citizens United decision as judicial activism favoring big
business at the expense of shareholders.  These observers argue that the proper3
solution for this intrusion by the courts into corporate governance is enactment
of one or more new laws to right the ship. This article argues that no such
solution is necessary or proper if we accept that the board of directors will, in
the area of political expenditures by their organizations, fulfill their duty to
steer the ship for the benefit of all stakeholders with a long-term perspective.
SUMMARY OF CITIZENS UNITED AND FEDERAL ELECTION LAW
On January 21, 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, holding that portions of the
2002 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), commonly known as the
McCain-Feingold Act,  prohibiting corporate and union expenditures for4
certain political communications, violated the First Amendment’s protection
of free speech. The Court found that the government’s interests in restricting
such expenditures were not important enough to justify the infringements on
free speech.  The Court’s decision sparked protests that the Court had5
overturned precedent to reach its ruling, and the Court had undervalued the
government’s interests in restricting such expenditures.6
Congress and state legislatures have attempted to rein in corporations’
ability to influence elections many times since at least the early 20th century.
One important purpose of such laws has been to avoid corruption or the
appearance of corruption.  In his dissenting opinion in Citizens United, Justice7
Stevens noted that the first such federal law was the Tillman Act, passed in
1907, which banned all corporate contributions to candidates.8
By the mid-20th century, it had become apparent that corporations and
labor unions could avoid the Tillman Act’s provisions by taking out ads in
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support of candidates, so long as there was no “coordination.”  As noted by9
Justice Stevens in his Citizens United dissent, the Taft-Hartley Act  was10
passed in 1947 in order to, among other reasons, prohibit corporations and
labor unions from using their corporate funds make what are today called
“independent expenditures” to support candidates indirectly in a way that they
could not do directly in a federal election.  An “independent expenditure” is11
defined today in FEC regulations as an expenditure for a communication
“expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate
that is not made in cooperation, consultation, or concert with, or at the request
or suggestion of, a candidate, a candidate’s authorized committee, or their
agents, or a political party or its agents.”  This concept of indirect, non-12
coordinated campaign contributions was a central issue sixty years later in
Citizens United.
Nearly a quarter of a century after the Taft-Hartley Act, Congress again
expressed its concern over the role of corporations in federal elections when
in 1971 it passed the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA),  which13
consolidated earlier election laws. FECA added more stringent disclosure
requirements for federal candidates.  However, due to continued perceived14
abuses during the 1972 federal elections, just three years after FECA became
law, Congress amended FECA in 1974 and created the Federal Election
Commission as a centralized enforcement agency for the law.  The 197415
amendments also provided the mechanism for the first publicly-funded
presidential election in 1976, and set limits on contributions by individuals,
political parties and political action committees (PACs).16
In response to the 1974 amendments to FECA, conservatives led by U.S.
Senator James Buckley of New York challenged, in Buckley v. Valeo, the
restrictions on, among other things, indirect expenditures for political
campaigns, using the argument that money is itself speech and the “quantity
4 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 29:1
17. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
18. Id. at 51.
19. Id. at 53.
20. Id. at 29. See also From Buckley to Citizens United, Part One of Two, NAHMOD L. (Feb. 26,
2010, 3:50 PM), http://nahmodlaw.com/2010/02/26/from-buckley-to-citizens-united-part-one/.
21. First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
22. Id. at 785.
23. Id. at 787–88.
24. Id. at 794–95. See also Adam Winkler, “Other People’s Money”: Corporations, Agency Costs,
and Campaign Finance Law, 92 GEO. L.J. 871 (2004) (discussing shareholder protection as a motivation
for campaign spending restrictions on corporations).
25. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 795 n.34 (noting that a dissenting shareholder “is free to withdraw his
investment at any time and for any reason”).
of expression” could not be limited under the First Amendment.  In 1976 the17
Supreme Court agreed with the plaintiffs in Buckley that the 1974 FECA
amendments had indeed violated the First Amendment when the law limited
the rights of individuals and groups to make independent expenditures.  The18
Buckley Court held that the government’s “important government interest” in
the prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption was not
sufficient to justify such a limitation on individuals.19
By contrast, the Buckley Court upheld a separate provision of the 1974
amendments that restricted an individual’s direct contributions to candidates,
ruling that this provision was justified by the same anti-corruption government
interest that was not sufficient for restricting independent expenditures.20
Two years later, in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,  the21
Supreme Court looked at the political speech rights of corporations in the
context of a Massachusetts statute prohibiting contributions and expenditures
by corporations for the purpose of affecting referenda votes. The Court held
that such a prohibition violated the corporation’s First Amendment rights, and
the First Amendment applied to corporations and to their political speech.22
The Bellotti Court considered but rejected the argument in support of the
Massachusetts law that it was necessary in order to protect shareholders who
disagreed with the political speech by the corporation.  The Court reasoned23
that shareholders “normally are presumed competent to protect their own
interests,” and they can decide “through the procedures of corporate
democracy, whether their corporation should engage in debate on public
issues.”  The Court noted that if shareholders disagreed with corporate24
political expenditures, whether because they believed they were made to
further the personal interests of management or simply were bad business
decisions, then they could bring derivative suits or sell their shares.25
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The next time that the Supreme Court had to apply the notion of an
“independent expenditures” limitation to corporations, it took a different
approach from Buckley (where it had struck down a restriction on such
expenditures), and in 1990, it upheld a Michigan law that barred corporations
from using treasury funds for independent campaign expenditures.  In Austin,26
the Court rested its decision on the new grounds that corporate political
speech could be constitutionally limited in order to prevent “the corrosive and
distorting effects of immense aggregations of [corporate] wealth” that it said
had “little or no correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s
political ideas.”  The Court took special note of the unique characteristics of27
corporations that contributed to their power, including perpetual existence,
separation of ownership and control and limitation of liability for
shareholders.  Justice Scalia was highly critical of the majority’s opinion in28
Austin, labeling the desire to equalize the resources available to different
political groups as “Orwellian.”29
The Court in Austin was not clear as to whether it was also relying on the
shareholder protection rationale in reaching its decision in the case. The Court
mentioned the shareholder protection rationale but only in its effort to
distinguish the facts in Austin from the facts in its 1982 decision in Federal
Election Commission v. National Right to Work Committee.  There, the Court30
agreed with the FEC that the shareholder protection rationale was a proper
justification for restrictions on a nonprofit organization’s wide-ranging public
solicitation for its PAC, along with the goal of avoiding “aggregations of
wealth amassed by the special advantages which go with the corporate form
of organization.”  This mention would set the stage for Chief Justice Roberts,31
two decades later in his Citizens United concurrence, who argued that it was
never intended to be a rationale for the Austin holding.32
By 2002, Congress once again believed that further revisions to federal
election law were necessary, particularly in order to curb the rise of “issue
ads” and to address the fact that election-related communications were
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occurring not only on broadcast television and radio but also on cable and
satellite media.  “Issue ads” were typically negative messages about33
candidates but were not covered by previous restrictions because they did not
use the words “vote no” or “vote against.”  So, in BCRA Congress added a34
new election law term, “electioneering communications,” defined to include
“any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication” that could be “received by
at least 50,000 people,” that “refers to a clearly identified candidate for
Federal office” and that is publicly distributed within 60 days before general
election (30 days before a primary election).  BCRA prohibited corporations35
and labor unions from making “independent expenditures” for “electioneering
communications.”36
Not long after McCain-Feingold was enacted, the first case challenging
its effects on corporate political speech made its way to the Supreme Court,
and the result was a defeat for corporations seeking to strike down BCRA as
violating the First Amendment. The Court held in McConnell v. Federal
Election Commission  that the new “electioneering communications”37
restrictions on corporations, unions and non-profits were necessary not only
to prevent the anti-corruption purposes of election laws but also to prevent the
“distorting” effect that the aggregated wealth of such organizations described
in the 1986 Right to Work Committee decision and the 1990 Austin decision.38
The Court believed that the remaining ability of corporations to give through
PACs was sufficient opportunity to engage in election advocacy.39
In 2007, the Supreme Court again addressed the constitutionality of the
McCain-Feingold Act’s restrictions on electioneering communications, in
Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.  This time, the40
majority opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts (who had joined the court
after McConnell) held that the only advertisements that could be kept off the
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air in the pre-election period covered by the law were those that are
“susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for
or against a specific candidate”; that is, those advertisements explicitly urging
a vote for or against a particular candidate.41
So, in summary, over the thirty-six years leading up to Citizens United,
the Supreme Court had zig-zagged on the question of whether the First
Amendment protects a corporation’s expenditures for political activities from
state or federal restrictions. McCain-Feingold’s restrictions on independent
expenditures for electioneering communications had survived through the
2008 elections, but commentators at the time predicted that further challenges
could lie ahead in view of the willingness of a majority in Wisconsin Right to
Life to force a narrowing of the law.42
With the above as a backdrop, a nonprofit education, advocacy and grass
roots corporation called Citizens United took center stage in federal election
law during the 2008 presidential campaign. According to its website,43
Citizens United’s mission is to “reassert the traditional American values of
limited government, freedom of enterprise, strong families, and national
sovereignty and security.”  The organization produced Hillary: The Movie,44
a 90-minute documentary about then-Senator Hillary Clinton, who was a
candidate for the Democratic Party’s nomination for president of the United
States in the 2008 campaign.
The movie was highly critical of Senator Clinton, including its
advertisements that portrayed Ms. Clinton against a dark and cloudy sky with
what appears to be a tornado forming above her head.  Citizens United45
distributed Hillary in theaters and on DVD, but also sought to distribute the
movie through video-on-demand channels on digital cable networks.  One46
cable company offered to make Hillary available on a video-on-demand
channel called “Elections 08” for a payment of $1.2 million to Citizens
United.47
Recognizing the tenuousness of its position under the existing election
law precedents, Citizens United requested a preliminary injunction from the
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United States District Court for the District of Columbia against the FEC from
enforcing the McCain-Feingold Act’s prohibition on “independent
expenditures” on “electioneering communications” against the distribution of
Hillary.  The district court denied the organization’s request,  and Citizens48 49
United sought review by the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court noted its jurisdiction for the appeal in 2008,  and the50
case was argued in March of 2009. In June 2009, however, after oral
arguments that had focused on narrow questions of how to interpret BCRA in
the context of Hillary, the Court instructed the parties to brief and argue
whether it should overrule its decisions in Austin and McConnell, which had
upheld restrictions on corporate speech.51
On January 21, 2010, in a majority opinion joined in by the justices
viewed by most as the “conservative” members of the Court (Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Alito, Scalia and Thomas), the Court decided
that indeed it should overrule Austin and McConnell and expand the First
Amendment rights of corporations.  Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy52
said, “Government may not suppress political speech on the basis of the
speaker’s corporate identity. No sufficient government interest justifies limits
on the political speech of nonprofit or for-profit corporations.”53
Noting that violation of BCRA could be a felony, the Court warned that
allowing the restrictions on corporations for independent expenditures on
films such as Hillary might make it a crime to distribute a film such as the
classic 1939 film Mr. Smith Goes to Washington, which placed establishment
Washington, D.C. in an unflattering light.  Justice Kennedy said that if54
BCRA were applied in such a way, “[s]peech would be suppressed in the
realm where its necessity is most evident: in the public dialogue preceding a
real election. Governments are often hostile to speech, but under our law and
our tradition it seems stranger than fiction for our Government to make this
political speech a crime.”55
Justice Stevens was joined in a vigorous 90-page dissent by the other
justices most often viewed as “liberal” (Ginsburg, Breyer and Sotomayor).
Justice Stevens decried the departure from the Court’s earlier respect for the
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government’s anti-corruption and anti-distortion interests in Austin and
McConnell. In particular, he criticized the unwillingness of the majority to
draw distinctions based on the speaker’s identity when interpreting the First
Amendment, noting that it has routinely done so in the past.56
The Court’s Citizens United decision sparked a firestorm of commentary,
pro and con, from a wide variety of sources, including bloggers,57
columnists,  law professors,  and shareholder activists.  Many58 59 60
commentators have called it a pro-business decision.  President Obama61
himself made a very public criticism of the case during his State of the Union
remarks just one week after the decision was handed down, when he stated,
“I don’t think American elections should be bankrolled by America’s most
powerful interests, or worse, by foreign entities.”  Justice Alito, a member of62
the majority on the opinion, was televised mouthing the words “that’s not
right” in response to the president’s remarks.  The topics covered in the63
various commentaries were as varied as the identities of the commentators,
revealing the richness of the subject matter at issue in the case, from election
law itself, to the possibility of an amendment to the Constitution to reverse the
result.
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IMPLICATIONS OF CITIZENS UNITED
Corporate governance can be viewed both as an internal process within
an organization and also as a process that has both internal and external
players. One definition of “corporate governance” is the “system by which
business corporations are directed and controlled.”  Such a broad definition64
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would include all of the various internal and external constituencies of a
business organization that might direct its governance, including its board of
directors; management; audit committee; internal risk managers; independent
auditors; lawyers; other “gatekeepers” such as ratings agencies and investment
bankers; regulators, particularly the Securities and Exchange Commission; and
Congress as it passes laws seeking to control corporate governance
processes.  The definition might also include taxpayers, at least in the case65
of bailed out companies.66
Citizens United itself involved a narrower definition of corporate
governance; the relationship between a corporation and its shareholders.
Specifically, the case raises the issues of whether shareholders should have a
say in how their corporations spend corporate funds in the political process
and whether laws restricting corporate political speech are justified by
protecting shareholders who might disagree with such spending.
Notwithstanding that Citizens United considered only the internal corporate
governance players of shareholders and management, the response to the case
has triggered calls for legislative “fixes,” which reflect the more macro
approach to the concept of corporate governance that would include regulators
and legislators.
At its broadest level of impact, Citizens United has been labeled as being
representative of the ascendency of big business as the most powerful force
in our society overall.  Shareholder activist Robert Monks has described the67
period from the late seventies through 2008 as America’s “Thirty Glorious
Years” during which corporate power increased yet co-existed with a well-
functioning democracy.  He believes that the financial crisis of 2007–201068
has shown that such co-existence is not possible and that Citizens United has
created a “compelling need” for “preemptive federal action” to reverse the
consequences of such power.69
Others might see the case as just another chapter in the cyclical rise and
fall over time of business’s influence.  Finally, some commentators have70
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suggested that the result in Citizens United raises the possibility that not only
corporate funds but also taxpayer funds might be used by bailed-out
businesses to help ensure “the reelection of politicians who treated the
corporation or executives favorably.”71
Within the four corners of the Citizens United opinion, the case raises
corporate governance in the various Justices’ discussion of whether protecting
shareholders is a constitutionally sufficient justification for restricting
corporate speech. In the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy rejects the
shareholder protection interest as a reason for restricting corporate speech.72
First, he notes that if such an interest were relied upon, then the Government
would be able to ban the political speech of even media corporations in order
to protect their dissenting shareholders, a ban that he says, the First
Amendment would never allow.73
Justice Kennedy’s second reason for rejecting the shareholder protection
interest argument provides a good illustration of some key current issues in the
role of shareholders in corporate governance. His general premise is that the
“procedures of corporate democracy” should be sufficient to protect
shareholders, citing First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti.  While not74
enumerated by Justice Kennedy in the Citizens United majority opinion, these
procedures for a shareholder would include bringing a derivative action;
selling the shareholder’s shares; voting in directors who agree with the
shareholder’s views (and vice versa) and, for publicly-held corporations, using
the shareholder proposal process found in Securities and Exchange
Commission Rule 14a-8.75
The majority in Citizens United argued that corporate democracy
mechanisms should be even more effective today than they would have been
at the time the McCain-Feingold Act was passed because modern technology
such as the Internet makes disclosures about corporate political spending
“rapid and informative.”76
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Chief Justice Roberts’s concurring opinion, joined in by Justice Scalia,
addressed mainly the stare decisis issues presented in the case.  The77
concurring opinion touched on the shareholder rights issue only to say that, in
his view, the Court in earlier cases such as Austin had actually never adopted
the shareholder protection rationale for campaign finance restrictions on
corporations.  So, lest anyone believe that the mere overruling of Austin is not78
enough to discredit the idea that the Court sees shareholder rights as a factor
in the First Amendment analysis as applied to corporations, Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Scalia thoroughly discredit that notion by expressly
removing it as an underpinning of earlier precedents.
Like many other points in the majority opinion, Justice Stevens takes a
forceful, opposite view of the shareholder protection rationale in his
dissenting opinion. He cites as one of the purposes of the 1907 Tillman Act,
“respect for the interest of shareholders and members in preventing the use of
their money to support candidates they opposed.”  In his summary of79
Supreme Court decisions on election law, he also quotes McConnell to say
that one of the purposes behind all of Congress’s regulation of “corporate
participation in candidate elections” was to “protect the expressive interests
of shareholders.”80
Not surprisingly, when considering the majority’s reliance on corporate
democracy as sufficient to protect shareholder interests, Justice Stevens’s
dissent expresses a considerably more jaundiced view:
It is an interesting question “who” is even speaking when a business corporation places
an advertisement that endorses or attacks a particular candidate. Presumably it is not the
customers or employees, who typically have no say in such matters. It cannot realistically
be said to be the shareholders, who tend to be far removed from the day-to-day decisions
of the firm and whose political preferences may be opaque to management.81
Justice Stevens’s view that shareholders lack meaningful input into the
management of a corporation is supported by commentators who describe the
difficulties with the shareholder derivative suit and shareholder proposal
processes. For example, these opponents attack the “business judgment rule”
under Delaware law for the protection it provides to most decisions by
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corporate officers and directors, including presumably decisions on how to
spend corporate funds in the political process.82
Similarly, opponents of the Citizens United result are suspicious of the
somewhat arcane rules of the Securities and Exchange Commission on
shareholder proposals that have been used to allow corporations to exclude
proposals requiring them to disclose (or limit) their political contributions.83
If such contributions are a matter “relating to the company’s ordinary business
operations,” then proposals relating to that topic may be excluded under the
rule.  However, if they represent a “significant policy issue,” then they may84
not be excluded.  As discussed below, it is entirely possible that Citizens85
United will have the dual but contradictory effects of encouraging more
shareholder proposals on political contributions but also establishing that such
contributions are day-to-day business operations and therefore excludable
under Rule 14a-8.
Observers of the Citizens United opinion have predicted that the case
might embolden management of public corporations to attempt to influence
elected officials to dilute shareholder rights even further.  For example, in a86
blog post entitled “Corporate Political Speech is Bad for Shareholders,” well-
known shareholder rights proponent Lucien Bebchuk of Harvard Law School
argues that the ownership of U.S. corporations is so dispersed that most
companies “are de facto controlled by professional managers.”  Bebchuk87
writes, “Such managers can be expected to use their influence to obtain and
maintain rules that weaken the rights of dispersed shareholders and make it
difficult for shareholders to replace them.  He further writes that when88
corporations are deciding on political expenditures, “their general investors
are not consulted. Rather, such decisions are likely to reflect the preferences
and objectives of the insiders who manage the companies, ostensibly on
shareholders’ behalf.”89
In short, Citizens United is a microcosm of one of the most contentious
current issues in business law, the power of shareholders to influence
corporate decision-making.
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LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS PROPOSED
In the months following the announcement of the Citizens United
decision, a wide variety of legislative responses have been proposed by
opponents of the decision, citing the weaknesses of existing remedies for
shareholders aggrieved by a corporation’s political expenditures noted above.
One suggestion has been a law that would set in motion an amendment of the
Constitution itself to provide that corporations are not “persons” at all, and are
not entitled to the protections of the Constitution afforded to persons, such as
the First Amendment free speech protections.  At the opposite extreme of the90
federalism spectrum, there have been state-level proposals for amendments of
state corporation laws to require that the board of directors approve any
political contributions.  There have also been a number of laws proposed at91
the state level that would require increased disclosure of campaign spending
by corporations and labor unions.92
Finally, opponents of the Citizens United result have proposed
amendments of various existing federal laws to undo that result. For example,
the DISCLOSE Act (Democracy is Strengthened by Casting Light on
Spending in Elections) passed the U.S. House of Representatives in June 2010
after the Citizens United decision.  It would restrict campaign expenditures93
and force advocacy groups, unions and corporations to disclose their major
donors and political advertising budgets.  Yet another approach directed at94
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public companies would be amendments to the federal securities laws to
require more disclosure of political activity, to give shareholders power to
authorize political spending by corporations and to impose new personal
liability on directors of companies that make unauthorized political
expenditures.95
It is these proposals that would require express changes in the ways that
shareholders, management and directors interact with each other that I address
below and further suggest that they are neither necessary nor proper. I offer
no opinion on the proposed amendment to the Constitution to take away
corporations’ “personhood” rights. The concept sounds like an exceedingly
complex one to have to explain to the many people who would have to be
involved in such an endeavor and perhaps unlikely to gain traction when one
considers that the “Equal Rights Amendment” failed. On the other hand,
depending upon the specifics of a proposal calling for increased disclosure,
including the exceptions granted,  added disclosures may indeed help inform96
the public policy discussion of campaign financing including among directors
and management.97
CHANGING THE RULES ON INTERACTIONS IS NOT THE
PROPER CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SOLUTION
To address the necessity or propriety of the proposals calling for new
governance behaviors by boards, management and shareholders, I first address
what appear to be the key assumptions underlying these proposals in order to
determine points of agreement or disagreement. First, of course, the proposals
assume that there is something broken about our election laws governing
expenditures by corporations. I do not disagree with this assumption. Clearly,
a system that engenders such vociferous reactions when a result is reached on
one side or the other is not operating properly.
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Second, the proposals assume that decisions on political expenditures are
related to corporate governance. If one adopts the broadest possible view of
what constitutes corporate governance, that it is the process by which the
myriad of functions are carried out in an organization and includes both
internal and external participants, then decisions on political expenditures are
indeed a part of corporate governance.  In certain cases, it is appropriate to98
require disclosures about such otherwise private decisions because public
policy-makers have judged that external parties deserve to know about the
matters being disclosed. To a very great extent, for example, the enforcement
approach of the Securities and Exchange Commission is premised on
requiring such transparency.
I do agree that in the broadest sense of the word “governance” it is proper
for legislatures to attempt to exert some control over the behavior of corporate
governance participants in order to fix a system that is not working properly.
Requiring disclosure of political expenditures serves to inform various
participants in the corporate governance process about the inner workings of
the corporation, just as requiring accurate SEC filings serve such a purpose.
Where I do disagree with the proponents of legislative solutions;
however, is exactly how far into the governance process of a corporation it is
necessary or proper for a legislature to venture. Requiring new behaviors in
the form of additional disclosures by management seems acceptable, as noted
above. But the proponents of new legislation seem to assume that they must
regulate the actual interaction (such as a new board or shareholder approval
requirement) among the three key corporate governance players, shareholders,
the board of directors and management, with management being on the losing
end of the new regulation in terms of its ability to participate in the
governance process.
If my one area of disagreement with the legislative fixes for corporate
political expenditures is that they should not impose new interaction rules
among the participants, what arguments do I have for saying that?
First, it should be noted that as described above the Supreme Court has
apparently rejected the idea that there is a constitutional reason for giving
shareholders more of a say in political expenditure decisions.  Indeed, it is the99
absence of such a view on the part of the Court that has prompted calls for
legislative mechanisms to provide shareholders with such a say.
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Second, the law of Delaware, under which most business corporations are
organized,  provides that the “business and affairs” of a business corporation100
is to be “managed under the direction of a board of directors,” except as may
be expressly provided otherwise by law or in the governing documents of the
corporation.  Other states might not have such a clear director-centric view101
on who’s in charge,  but the reality is most larger corporations can rely on102
this fundamental principle of governance because they are incorporated in
Delaware.
Decisions on political expenditures are part of the “business and affairs”
of a corporation that should be managed “under the direction” of the board of
directors. In turn, of course, the board delegates day-to-day decisions to
management.  Proponents of using corporate governance to fix the problems103
with corporate political spending seek to “expressly provide otherwise by
law,” but the fundamental principle remains clear that absent such a new law,
shareholders are generally to stay out of the “business and affairs” of the
corporation.
Although it has been criticized by those seeking a more shareholder-
centric approach to corporate governance,  the judicial branch of the104
Delaware government recently confirmed the statutory foundation for placing
responsibility for management of a corporation with the board. In C.A. Inc. v.
AFSCME Employees Pension Plan,  a union pension plan proposed a bylaw105
amendment that would compel the corporation to reimburse stockholders for
reasonable expenses incurred in a proxy fight, if the stockholders succeeded
in electing at least one director. C.A. Inc. asked the SEC to permit it to exclude
this proposed bylaw under SEC Rule 14a-8 on several grounds, including that
it was not a “proper subject” for shareholder action under Delaware law
because it contravened Del. Gen. Corp. L. § 141 by invading the authority of
the board of directors. The SEC certified this question of whether it was a
“proper subject” to the Delaware Supreme Court.  The Court found that the106
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bylaw violated Section 141 by attempting to curb the right and ability of the
board to manage the corporation’s business and affairs.  The Court held that107
if the directors were to have agreed to this restriction, they would have
breached their fiduciary duties.108
At this point, it may be useful to remember why it is that Delaware law,
and indeed the law of most states, seems to give so much power to the board
and so little to shareholders, the owners of the corporation. Have shareholders
been shortchanged? The answer is most certainly no if one considers that
shareholders won the all-important limitation from liability for the acts and
omissions of their corporations in exchange for agreeing not to participate in
the “ordinary” business of the organization. Section 102 of the Delaware
General Corporation Law provides that the stockholders or members of a
Delaware corporation “shall not be personally liable for the payment of the
corporation’s debts except as they may be liable by reason of their own
conduct or acts.”109
Of course, the debate over exactly what rights shareholders should be
given in corporate governance is considerably more nuanced than to allow
Section 102’s limitation on liability for shareholders to be used to foreclose
them from gaining any new powers. The law of corporate governance must
evolve as the nature of corporations and their various constituents change.
Still, it is useful to remember that not even the business judgment rule gives
directors the protection from liability that Section 102 gives to shareholders,
and this protection certainly has to be worth something as we consider what
to give and take among corporate governance participants.
Even at the federal level, the primary participant in the corporate
governance process, the Securities and Exchange Commission, has
acknowledged that shareholder rights must be limited by the restrictions
imposed on them under state corporation law. Rule 14a-8 of the SEC allows
shareholders who meet certain ownership and length-of-holding thresholds to
place proposals in the annual proxy statements of public companies for
consideration by all shareholders.  Rule 14a-8(i)(1) permits exclusion if a110
proposal is “not a proper subject for action by shareholders under the laws of
the jurisdiction of the company’s organization.”  Significantly, the SEC’s111
view is that so long as a proposal is cast as a recommendation or a request that
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the board take specified action, it is proper under most states’ laws.  In other112
words, the SEC recognizes that most state laws do not permit shareholders to
tell the board what to do. As a result, most shareholder proposals are cast as
recommendations or requests.
As a corollary to Rule 14a-8(i)(1), a company may also exclude a
proposal if it relates to “ordinary business operations.”  The SEC has113
explained that the term refers to “matters that are not necessarily ‘ordinary’
in the common meaning of the word, and is rooted in the corporate law
concept providing management with flexibility in directing certain core
matters involving the company’s business and operations.”114
Even before Citizens United, many companies had received shareholder
proposals relating to corporate political contributions, and more can be
expected now that the Court’s decision has made such contributions even
easier to make. Most companies have not heretofore relied on the “ordinary
business operations” exception to Rule 14a-8 to exclude these proposals.
Rather, they have relied on other exceptions in the rule, such as for proposals
that were sufficiently “vague and indefinite” that they would cause the proxy
statement to be “materially misleading,”  or for proposals that have been115
“substantially implemented.”  With Citizens United establishing that116
corporations’ political expenditures are so “core” to their existence as to
deserve First Amendment protection, it would not be surprising to see
companies now relying on the “ordinary business operations” exception in the
future.117
I am not suggesting that the SEC should start automatically allowing
companies to exclude precatory shareholder proposals related to political
expenditures on the grounds that they relate to “ordinary business operations.”
Indeed, as discussed below, it may be that if directors hear about such
proposals they will be better informed and better able to “direct” management
as to the decisions that management makes on these expenditures. Rather, I am
recognizing that in our dual system of government regulation over corporate
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governance, even the federal government’s participant in that system
recognizes that ordinary business decisions are not the province of
shareholders. And, more importantly, political contributions are “ordinary
business operations.”
The “ordinariness” of decisions on political contributions can be
measured both quantitatively and qualitatively. Quantitatively, political
expenditures are not likely to be important to the financial results that drive
shareholder value such as stock price and the ability to pay dividends. They
do have to be recorded, but that does not mean that they necessarily have to
be disclosed. Since 1977, to the extent that a public company does make a
political expenditure, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act amendments to the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 have required that the company’s books and
records fairly reflect those transactions.118
From a pure numerical perspective, such expenditures are not likely to be
“material” for purposes of disclosure under the federal securities laws. The
SEC itself has acknowledged that many companies follow a rule of thumb that
the misstatement or omission of an item that falls under a 5 percent threshold
“is not material in the absence of particularly egregious circumstances, such
as self-dealing or misappropriation by senior management.”  It is hard to119
imagine that political expenditures at public companies would ever reach 5
percent of any meaningful figure, such as revenues, operating expenses or
even net income. For example, Hewlett-Packard Corporation, considered a
model for the transparency of its disclosures of its political expenditures,120
has disclosed that it spent just over $1 million in 2009 on corporate
contributions to political candidates and organizations, and it had $7.66 billion
in net income for that year.  If a company did cross a materiality threshold121
in such spending, then the spending ought to be disclosed, and perhaps more
directly overseen by directors, but not approved by directors and certainly not
approved by shareholders.
Qualitatively, political expenditures are no different from the many other
decisions that managers must make every day without direct shareholder
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involvement. One of the leading proponents of a “director-centric” view of
corporate governance is Professor Stephen Bainbridge of UCLA School of
Law. Responding to Professor Bebchuk’s concerns in the wake of Citizens
United that decisions on political expenditures “are likely to reflect the
preferences and objectives of the insiders who manage the companies,”122
Bainbridge replied, “So what? When corporations decide which products to
make, what kind of advertising to run, and which employee benefits to offer,
‘their general investors are not consulted.’”123
Moreover, it can be argued that political expenditures are even less likely
to be made than product, advertising and employee benefit expenditures
because the return on investment for them is so questionable. To most
managers, these expenditures are just another expense which, unless they can
produce revenues that flow quickly to the bottom line, are not likely going to
be in the budget and are not likely to be made. The pressure on short term,
quarter-by-quarter, results simply does not allow for the kind of extravagant
spending on political matters that some imagine. And, with the recent Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act  financial regulatory124
reform bill likely to cost business many millions of dollars, there are not likely
to be many public company CEOs who see a good return on investment from
political expenditures.
SUGGESTIONS FOR BOARD-MANAGEMENT-SHAREHOLDER INTERACTIONS
Short of dictating the balance of power among shareholders, the board of
directors and management by directing how they should interact in order to
effect change in corporate political spending, what might be done to advance
the public policy debate? I start with the premise that boards and yes, even
management, wish to do the right thing for as many stakeholders as they can.
I do not see subjecting corporate managers to greater board oversight as
analogous to throwing “Brer Rabbit in the Briar Patch.”  The trend toward125
more independent directors and fewer CEOs on corporate boards might make
this increasingly true.
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Perhaps one of the highest and best uses of a board of directors is to
oversee the reputation risks taken by management of the corporation. Because
most of them are seasoned, independent and presumably concerned with their
own reputations, directors should be able to discern issues that pose reputation
risks for a corporation if not handled effectively. These would include issues
that arise from expenditures, like political expenditures, that are not in and of
themselves material from a purely financial perspective.
I am not suggesting a particular structure for this or any other risk
management by a board of directors. Indeed, to do so would be akin to the
very proposals described above that I believe are not necessary. For example,
in response to the widespread belief that the failure of boards of directors in
the financial services industry to oversee the risks led to the problems in the
financial markets beginning in 2007,  the Dodd-Frank legislation now126
requires that certain publicly-traded non-bank financial companies supervised
by the Federal Reserve establish separate risk committees.127
I am suggesting that boards of directors continuously identify significant
issues of public and social policy that might affect the corporation’s
reputation, and actively oversee management’s handling of these issues.
Sensitizing boards to this responsibility and to current issues would be an
appropriate topic for continuing education efforts for directors. For example,
directors could be directed to the sources of public disclosures on the
company’s political expenditures, which might be growing in number.  As128
noted by the majority in Citizens United, modern technology such as the
Internet makes disclosures about corporate political spending “rapid and
informative.”129
For its part, management should be encouraged to provide its own take
on such issues to the board by disclosing all shareholder proposals made to the
corporation, whether or not subsequently withdrawn. For example, there was
an immediate uptick in the number of shareholder proposals on political
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contributions immediately following the Citizens United decision.  Some of130
them were withdrawn after the companies adopted disclosure policies.131
Another way for directors to oversee issues such as political expenditures
and their effect on a corporation’s reputation would be to make a concerted
effort to find ways to listen to shareholders, who both help form and are
affected by a corporation’s reputation. Again, I am not suggesting an
institutionalized structure for such meetings, such as that adopted recently by
the pharmaceutical company Pfizer.  Rather, interaction with institutional132
shareholders on social and public policy issues could be far less structured,
consisting perhaps of occasional meetings of the type Pfizer has commenced.
This interaction could also take the form of monitoring of websites of
organizations such as the Council of Institutional Investors, which is made up
of union and pension fund members with combined assets of over $3 trillion
and which has well-defined views on social and public policy issues, including
corporate disclosure of political contributions.  Concerns with compliance133
with SEC Regulation FD, which prohibits selective disclosure of material
information by public companies,  should be manageable if the focus of any134
direct communications with institutional shareholders is listening to the
concerns of the shareholders.
The purpose of informing the board and management on political
expenditures and other social and public policy issues should not be primarily
to influence short-term decision-making on such expenditures. Rather, as
advocated by lawyer Martin Lipton, a well-known expert on corporate policy,
the purpose of any efforts directed at changing corporate governance should
be to encourage investing by the corporation “for long-term growth and true
value creation.”  In the context of the corporate governance of political135
expenditures, this would mean common sense board and management
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practices that encourage relationship building with public policy-makers,
including elected officials, that benefit the corporation over the long term.
